ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

I am of opinion that so much of the judgment as is appealed
from must be reversed.
L. J., agreed.

BRETT,

Here we have another proof that the
American courts, and not the English,
have adopted the true doctrine in regard
to the acquisition of a right to light, by
what is called a prescriptive enjoyment
of it ; for in all analogous instances the
English courts themselves act upon the
same rule which we apply to a claim of
a right to light. All the arguments in
favor of establishing a right to light by
long use of it apply equally in favor of
acquiring a right to air by the same
length of enjoyment ; all the considerations against gaining the rights in the
latter case are equally forcible in the
former. It is impossible to be acquiring
prescriptive rights against another by a
series of acts, or a long continuation of
enjoyment which the other party has no
legal right to complain of, or prevent
by any known legal remedy. The very
foundation of a prescriptive right-the
most essential of all others-the adverse
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use, is wanting. If a person can not
acquire by prescription a right to a continued flow of air to his windmill, as decided in lI'ebb v. Bird, nor to a free
current of air to his chimney-tops, as
heli in our principal case, how can he
any more gain such right to a continued
flow of light into his windows ?
If a house-owner can not acquire by
any length of time a prescriptive right
to support from his adjoining neighbor's
soil, as held in Angus v. Dalton, 17 Am.
Law Reg. 645, why should he be allowed
to do so by mere overlooking his neighbor's ground? The argument of Chief
Justice CocxBEtRN, in Angus v. Dalton,
is unanswerable, and, although a majority of the judges in the Court of
Appeal did not agree with it (see 27
Weekly Rep.) it remains to be seen
whether it will not be finally held to be
the common law of England.
Enxuxs H. BEtxzTr.
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ATTORNEY.
Authority to receive Mfoney for Client-Possessionof Mortgage-Deed
executed by Client.--The mere fact that a solicitor is in possession of a
mortgage-deed executed by his client, does not authorize him to receive
the mortgage-money for the client; Ex parte Swinbanks, Law Rep.

11 Ch. Div.
3 Selected from recent numbers of the Law Reports.
From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 89 Ills. Rep.
* From John H. Stewart, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 31 N. J. Equity Rep.
4 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 51 Vt. Rep.
*
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If the client has not received the money, the mortgagee cannot maintain the validity of the mortgage-deed, by showing that he paid the
money to the solicitor, unless he can show that the solicitor was expressly
authorized by the client to receive it: Id.
Viney v. Chaplin, 2 DeG. & J. 468, followed. Barker v. Greenwood,
2Y. & C., Ex. 414, distinguished: Id.
BANK AND BANKER.

Agent-Following Moneq-Priority.-A banking company were employed as agents to collect money and to remit it to their employers.
The bank received the money in cash, placed it with the other cash of
the bank, and informed their employers that the money had been
remitted; but before the money was actually remitted, the bank went
into liquidation: Held, that the money was part of the general assets
of the bank, and that the employers of the bank were not entitled to 'be
paid, in priority to the other creditors: In re West of England and
South Wales District Bank, Law Rep. 11 Oh. Div.
Pennell v. Deffel, 4 D. M. & G. 372, considered : Id.
BROKER.
* Finding a Furcha.ser-Specfic Performance-Agent.-A person was
employed to find a purchaser for a piece of property, the price to be fixed
by the vendor. Having found a purchaser, with whom the vendor
agreed as to the price; held, that the conduct of the agent having been
imposed upon him in the matter, by reason of
fair,
further
duty was
such no
special,
qualified
agency : .Hughes v. Young, 31 N. J. Eq.
The purchaser was to give a mortgage for part of the purchase.money.
He offered to pay the whole in cash, if desired. Held, that, under the
circumstances, the fact of his insolvency would not avail as a defence
against specific performance: Id.
The buyer did not disclose the fact that he was, in fact, purchasing
for another person. Held, that he was under no duty to disclose his
principal: Id.
Power of Expub-ion-Rights of Member-Misconduct-Inunction.
-The committee of a club, being a quasi-judicial tribunal, are bound
in proceeding under their rules against a member of the club for alleged
misconduct, to act according to the ordinary rules of justice, and are
not to convict him of an offence warranting his expulsion from the club,
without giving him due notice of their intention to proceed against him
and affording him an opportunity of defending or palliating his conduct; and the court will, at the instance of any member so proceeded
against, restrain the committee by injunction from interfering with his
rights of membership: Fisherv. Keane, Law Rep. 11 Ch. Div.
CommON CARRIER.

See Stoppage in Transitu.

Limitation of Liability.-The right of a carrier to limit its common.
law liability by contract, if made fairly and advisedly on behalf of the
shipper cannot be denied; but the mere fact that the bill of lading
given, contains a clause exempting the carrier from the loss of goods by
fire, cannot be held conclusive of such a contract: Merchants' Desp.
Trans. Go. v. Leysor, 89 Ills.
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CORPORATION.

Liability of a Corporationin the Hands of Trustees.-Where-a railroad is in the hands of trustees exercising the same function the corporation is formed to exercise, and who were selected by the corporation
as well as its bondholders, and are operating the road to earn money to
be applied in payment of the debts of the corporation, the trustees will
be regarded as the agents of the corporation, so far as relates to the
transaction of business with third persons, and such persons may sue
the corporation and recover damages in respect to transactions had with
such trustees, and will not be compelled to sue the trustees: Grand
Tower Man~f. Co. v. Ullrman, 89 Ills.
Garnishment of a Stockholder.-A stockholder in an incorporated
company, who owes the company for unpaid stock, upon which a call
has been made and notice given, is liable to be garnisheed on a judgment recovered against the company: Meints v. East St. Louis Rail
Iill Co., 89 Ills.
DEED.
Rectification of in Equity-Mistake.-Relief prayed by a bill to rectify a deed, whereby through the mutual mistake of the parties, a lot
of land was conveyed instead of an adjoining one, can only be granted
by transferring to such adjoining lot the encumbrances put on the former by the parties: Weston v. Wilson, 31 N. J. Eq.
DOWER.
Right as against Heir taking by Deed-Measure of VFahle where Im.
provements made.-There is no difference in the legal effect of a conveyance to a stranger for a valuable consideration and one to a child for
a good consideration, as regards the right of the grantor's widow to
dower in the premises conveyed. In assessing the value of her dower,
in such case, she will be confined to the improvements on the land, at
the time of the conveyance, although after the conveyance, the grantor
may have erected a house on the premises with his own means: Stookey
v. Stookey, 89 Ills.
EQUITY. See Deed.
Practice-Cross-Bill.-Across-bill is not necessary in a suit between
partners, wherein the complainant seeks a dissolution and an account
from the defendant, to enable the latter to get an account from the for.
mer, or to obtain relief against fraudulent practices of the complainant
in giving the note of the firm without consideration, for his own benefit,
and in buying up the paper of the concern at a discount, for his advantage, with a view. to obtaining the full amount thereof out of the assets
of the firm. Such a bill will not be sustained on demurrer: Johnson v.
Buttler, 31 N. J. Eq.
See Sale.
Trustee Process Summoning Administrator.-An administrator holding money, proceeds of a settled estate, is chargeable as trustee of one
entitled thereto in distribution of such proceeds, on trustee process summoning him in his personal and not in his representative capacity: Hoyt
T. Christie, 51 Vt.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
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GUARANTY.

Absolute undertakng-Suret.-B. sold certain property to W., taking W.'s notes therefor, signed by W. and by H. as surety, agreeing
that if W. should sell the property, the indebtedness might be transferred
to his purchasers. W. sold the property to L. and E., they agreeing to
assume his indebtedness. B. met the parties pursuant to a notice from
S. W., who acted in that matter as agent for W., and was asked to transfer the debt. He suggested that as it would take some time to compute
the notes, it would be as well for L. and E. to assume the debt by writing on the notes themselves, to which all assented, whereupon L. and
E. wrote on the back of each note, " We hereby assume and agree to pay
this note," and dated and signed the same. S. W. then understood that
L. and E. had assumed the debt absolutely, and that the signers of the
notes were relieved from further liability. B., when afterwards inquired
of by the defendants, said, in effect, that the defendants need have no
concern, as the debt was that of other parties. Held, that the undertaking of L.and E. was absolute; and that as the contract to substitute
the indebtedness of ]L. and E.for that of H. and W. was executed in a
manner satisfactory to B., H. and W. were relieved from all liability on
account of the original indebtedness: Nelson v. Wells, 51 Vt.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Wife's Chose in Action-Reduction into Possession-Receiptby Agent
of Husband and Wife.-The receipt by an agent, appointed by husband
and wife, of money forming part of the estate of an intestate of which
the wife is administratrix, amounts to a reduction into possession by the
husband of the wife's distributive share of the money. Huntley v. Griffith, F. Moore 452; Goldsborough 159, followed: In re Barber,Law
Rep. 11 Oh. Div.
INPANT.

Contract-FraudulentRepresentations.-Plaintiff,falsely representing
himself to be of full age, bought a wagon of defendant, paying part of
the purchase-money, and giving his promissory note secured by a lien on
the wagon for the remainder. After plaintiff had used the wagon until
the use he had had of it was worth more than what he had paid, and
until it had depreciated by more than a like sum, he made default in
payment, whereupon defendant took the wagon under his lien, and sold
it at auction. Plaintiff thereupon brought assumpsit for the money he
had paid. Held, that as defendant retook the wagon, plaintiff was
relieved of the duty of returning it or rescinding the contract, and
might recover, notwithstanding the depreciation and the value of the
use of the wagon; and that it made no difference that plaintiff falsely
represented himself of age, as such a representation could add nothing
to the obligation of the contract: Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt.
INSURANCE.

Proposalfor Policy on Life-Concealment.-In a proposal by M. to
an assurance office for an assurance on his life, in answer to the question,
" Has a proposal ever been made on your life at any other office or
offices? If so, where? Was it accepted at the ordinary premium, or
at an increased premium, or declined ?" his answer was, "Insured now
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in two offices for 16,0001. at ordinary rates. Policies effected last year."
The proposal was accepted, but the office having subsequently ascertained
that the life or n. had been declined by several offices: Held, that
there had been a material concealment, and that the office was entitled
to have the contract set aside. London Assurance v. Mansel, Law Rep.
11 Ch. Div.
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES.

Term defined -The term "legal representatives," in its strict and literal acceptation, means executors or administrators, but it is frequently
used in a different sense, even in statutes, as well as in wills, deeds, contracts, &c., and, therefore, the question of intention is to be considered
in its cunstruction-not gathered solely from the instrument itself, but,
in part from concomitant circumstances, and the existing state of things,
and the relative situation of the parties to be affected by it: Bowman
v. Long, 89 Ills.
LI.MITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Evidence-Burden,of Proof.-In debt on judgment of a court of
another state rendered more than eight years before action brought,
defendant gave notice of reliance on the Statute of Limitations, and on
the fact that during more than eight years of that time he had resided
in this state and had known attachable property therein. Held, that
the allegation as to residence and the possession of property was surplusage as part of the defence, and needed not to be proved ; and that the
burden was on plaintiff to prove whatever he relied on to show that the
statute had not run : C,'pen v. Woodrow, 51 Vt.
SALE.

See Stoppage in Transitu.

Executor's Sale- Caveat Emptor.-In the absence of actual fraud
on the part of an executor to induce the purchase of land of his testator, the rule of caveat emptor applies in all its strictness. The general
rule is, that in such sales a purchaser taking no covenants to cover
defects in title, is absolutely without relief, unless a fraud has been
practised upon him, sufficient to vitiate the contract: Bond v. Ramsey,
89 Ills.
SHERIFF'S SALE.

f requirements subtantially complied with Purchaserwill take Title.Where the proceedings of an officer on an execution are in substantial
compliance with the law, and operate by their legal force, unaided by
any consent of the judgment-debtor, to transfer to the purchaser the
title of the property sold thereunder, the sale though somewhat informal
and defective, is a good sheriff's sale, and will protect the purchaser in
his right to51the
Vt.property without a change of possession: _Fitz atrick v.
Peabody,
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See Broker.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

End of Transit-Delivery to Purchaser- Contract to deliver Good8
free on board Ship to be named by Purchaser.-Delivery of goods by
the vendor to a carrier, even though the carrier be nominated and hired
by the purchaser, is only constructive, not actual delivery to the pur-
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chaser, inasmuch as the contract with a carrier to carry goods does not
make the carrier the agent or servant of the person with whom he contracts: .Br.parteRosevear Clay Co., Law Rep. 11 Oh. Div.
Till the goods are in the actual possession of the purchaser the transit
is not at an end, and it makes no difference that their ultimate destination has not been communicated by the purchaser to the vendor i Id.
SUBROGATION.

Volunteer Credtor.-A mere stranger or volunteer cannot, by paying
a debt for which another is bound, be subrogated to the creditor's rights
in respect to the security given by the real debtor, but if the person
who pays the debt is compelled to do so for the protection of his own
interests and rights, then the substitution should be made: Young v.
Morgan, 89 Ills.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
.Dischargeof Trustee- Unwillingness to Act.-A trustee is at liberty
to apply to this court for his release from the trust, on the sole ground
of unwillingness to act further therein: Green v. Blackwell, 31 N. J.
Eq.
The fact that he is one of two trustees, and that the deed of trust
provides that, in case of the death of one, the survivor shall nominate,
and with the consent and approbation of the parties to the settlement
or the survivors or survivor of them, appoint a new trustee in the place
of the one who has died, will not induce the court to refuse the release.
The court will supply the place of the trustee released: Id.
That a very large and unexpected addition to the trust estate has been
made, is in itself, a good reason for releasing an unwilling trustee : Id.
TRUSTEE PROCESS.

See Executor.

USURY.

Who may raise the Question.-The right of action to recover for
money paid as usury is personal to the contracting party. The purchaser of property subject to a mortgage given to secure notes drawing
usurious interest, who assumes to pay such notes, cannot, therefore,
recover money paid for such interest thereon: Spaulding v. Davis,
51 Vt.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Rescission for M'aud.-To resist the payment of the purchase-money
of land for fraud, the purchaser must elect to rescind the contract, and
it is doubtful whether his grantees after his death can reconvey the
property so as to work a rescission of the contract and enable him to
resist payment: Bond v. Ramsey, 89 Ills.
WILL.
Devises and Descent regulated by Statute.-The rules providing for
the descent of property have their origin in municipal regulation, and
so too the power to dispose of property by will is conferred by statute,
and may be curtailed or enlarged from time to time as the legislative
department may deem wise and for the best interest of the people: mmert v. Hays, 89 Ills.

